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Online Sports Betting: The Opportunities and Risks for 
Banks 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sports betting has existed almost as long as sports themselves, 
with ancient Romans placing wagers on the results of chariot races at the 
Circus Maximus centuries ago.1  Sports betting is the process of allowing 
individuals to place wagers on the outcomes of specific sporting events.2  
For many years sports betting was illegal in the United States due to the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”),3 
which prohibited states from legalizing the process.4  However, in 2018 
this act was found unconstitutional in the decision of Murphy v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association.5  Since this ruling, there has been a 
proliferation of legalization among the states, with twenty-two legalizing 
sports betting as of 2020.6 
Today, sports betting is a popular American pastime with $20 
billion in bets placed since 2018,7 and a sports betting industry projected 
to be worth $8 billion by 2025.8  There have been pushes for further 
legalization across the nation, with a 2017 survey indicating that 55% of 
 
1. The circus maximus was the main chariot track in the middle of Rome where the highest 
level of chariot racing took place. Mark Cartwright, Circus Maximus, ANCIENT HIST. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (May 16, 2018) 
https://www.ancient.eu/Circus_Maximus/ [https://perma.cc/3G42-WN5P]. 
2. Ed Grabianowaski, How Sports Betting Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
https://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/sports-betting.htm [https://perma.cc/DK3J-UN36] 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2020). 
3. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 
3701–3704 (2018). 
4. Id. 
5. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85 (2018). 
6. Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where Every 
State Stands, ESPN (June 9, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/the-
united-states-sports-betting-where-all-50-states-stand-legalization [https://perma.cc/V7MC-
FZ72]. 
7. David Purdum, Sports Betting’s Growth in U.S. ‘Extraordinary’, ESPN (May 14, 2020) 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/29174799/sports-betting-growth-us-extraordinary 
[https://perma.cc/PZ93-HZLD]. 
8. Associated Press, Sports Betting Market Expected to Reach $8 Billion by 2025, 
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the American public supports legalization.9  However, the banking 
industry does not share the same positive opinions towards sports betting 
as the American public, as many financial institutions still refuse to offer 
their services to the sports betting industry.10  This refusal is primarily 
due to fears of being fined for assisting in money laundering, as sports 
betting has been previously used to cover up money laundering schemes 
prior to PASPA.11  There is significant risk to their cautious approach 
because the sports betting industry is growing rapidly and the banks that 
act first will protect their current customer base while also capitalizing on 
new revenue streams.12  
For many years, sports betting was illegal in the United States on 
account of the PASPA.13  This all changed in 2018 with the Supreme 
Court decision, Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.14  
This decision found that PASPA was unconstitutional under the Tenth 
Amendment,15 giving the states the ability to choose their own paths 
forward regarding whether or not they wanted to create legalized sports 
betting regimes.16  Since this decision, there has been a surge in different 
regulatory schemes aimed at legalizing sports betting among the various 
states.17 
 
9. Rick Maese & Emily Guskin, Poll: For First Time, Majority of Americans Approve of 




10. See Amanda Alix, Bank of America Says "Yes" to Pot, "No" to Online Casinos, THE 
MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 24, 2013, 9:22 AM) (exploring how banks came to interact with the 
cannabis industry as well as online casinos) 
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/11/24/bank-of-america-says-yes-to-pot-no-to-
online-casin.aspx [https://perma.cc/8XDS-XNAC]. 
11. Jon Prior, Banks Steer Clear of Sports Gambling Even as More States Legalize It, AM. 





12. See Kevin Wack, Sports Gambling is Next Hot-Button Issue for Banks, AM. BANKER 
(May. 15 2018, 2:10 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/just-what-banks-need-
another-hot-button-issue-in-sports-gambling [https://perma.cc/Y965-KSZP] (arguing that 
banks may lose customers and ceded opportunity for revenue by not getting involved with 
sports betting). 
13. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 
3701–3704 (2018). 
14. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85 (2018). 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Rodenberg, supra note 6. 
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During all of this, banks have remained wary of sports betting and 
many have not yet decided whether they wish to do business with sports 
betting operators.18  In this way, banks have avoided the fledgling 
industry in the same way they have avoided the growing cannabis 
industry, another industry being legalized at the state level after a long 
period of illegality everywhere.19  However, unlike the cannabis industry, 
which has the unmitigable risk of federal intervention,20 the risk of money 
laundering in sports betting can be reduced by state action.21  Because of 
this, banks should focus on what states and sportsbooks are doing to 
mitigate the risk of money laundering rather than waiting for the risk to 
fully eliminated.22 
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part II describes the history of 
sports betting in the United States and how Murphy upended that system 
and left regulation up to the states.  Part III explores federal anti-money 
laundering law and the effect it has on the sports betting industry.  Part 
IV examines the cannabis industry and the reaction banks have had to 
legalization by the states, as well as how the cannabis and sports betting 
industries are different.  Part V considers some of the current regulations 
and industry practices that protect online sports betting from the negative 
issues associated with gambling.  Finally, Part VI provides a brief 
conclusion of why banks should not treat sports betting the same as they 
do cannabis. 
II.  SPORTS BETTING: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT DEVELOPED, AND WHERE IT IS 
GOING 
A.         The Mechanics of Sports Betting 
At its core, sports betting is the act of placing a wager on who 
will win a sporting event.23  Today, however, people are able to bet on all 
 
18. Wack, supra note 12. 
19. See Alix, supra note 10 (exploring how banks came to interact with the cannabis 
industry as well as online casinos).  
20. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2020) (making cannabis illegal to own under federal law, 
which means the market could be shut down at any time). 
21. See e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/25-25 (2020) (providing all the protections Illinois 
requires from sports betting); see also 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.2-16 (2020) (adding 
sports betting to the list of activities under the eye of the Rhode Island Lottery). 
22. See Why We Won’t See a Federal Sports Betting Bill Soon, IFRAHLAW (July 30, 2018) 
https://www.ifrahlaw.com/ifrah-on-igaming/wont-see-federal-sports-betting-bill-soon/ 
[https://perma.cc/F2PM-KP73] (explaining the reasons why a federal response will take a 
long time). 
23. Grabianowski, supra note 2. 
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aspects of the event, such as the particular score, participant performance, 
and even the first participant to get a foul.24  Bets are created by 
oddsmakers, individuals who use previous matches’ statistics to create 
odds.25  These odds are then made into a bet when they are offered to the 
public by a bookmaker who is working for a casino or other betting 
provider.26  The odds are not the oddsmaker’s prediction of what will 
occur but are actually an oddsmaker’s prediction of what bet is most 
likely to get the same amount of people on each side of the bet.27  Sports 
betting operators make their money by taking a small fee for their 
services.28  As sports betting has progressed, bets have grown more 
sophisticated, with many bookmakers now responsible for drawing up the 
spreads on sporting events, which allows people to bet on a sporting event 
between two mismatched teams.29  Bookmakers are also tasked with 
creating parlay bets, which are a collection of minor bets that all must be 
correct to payout.30 
B.         History of Sports Betting and the Federal Ban 
In the United States, sports betting has had a long and often 
unsavory history.31  Perhaps the most infamous sports betting event is the 









31. See generally Richard Johnson, The Centuries-Old History of How Sports Betting 
Became Illegal in the United States in the First Place, SB NATION, (May 18, 2018, 8:00 AM) 
https://www.sbnation.com/2018/5/18/17353994/sports-betting-illegal-united-states-why 
[https://perma.cc/6NEL-8LU5] (exploring the long standing history of sports betting and the 
drive to make it illegal). 
32. The Black Sox Scandal concerned eight members of the Chicago White Sox baseball 
team, who allegedly threw the World Series against the Cincinnati Reds after the Sox were 
favored as much as 3-to-1 before the series.  There have been extensive discussions about 
how involved eight players were in the fix. Some have claimed the Sox tried to rally with one 
game left in the series but ultimately continued the fix because of threats to their families.  
The scandal may have remained rumors forever, until one of the gamblers, Bill Mahrag, went 
public with his account of the fix that led to the testimony of the players before a grand jury. 
Surprisingly, they were never convicted in court because all the grand jury testimony papers 
were stolen before trial, leaving the prosecution with no evidence.  In any event, Judge Landis, 
who had just been appointed the commissioner of baseball, handed down an internal decision 
of a lifetime ban for each player.  Since then, there has been much discussion around whether 
the players should be allowed to finally, enter the hall of fame but nothing has ever come of 
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Sox were accused of throwing the 1919 World Series after allegedly 
being paid off by the New York mobster Arnold Rothstein.33  Although 
none of the players were found guilty of a crime at trial, all were 
permanently banned from professional baseball.34  After this scandal, no 
state would endorse or legalize sports betting in any form until 1955, 
when Nevada created a state gaming board and began to accept wagers 
on sporting events.35  Such scandals have persisted even after PASPA 
was passed: in 2007 the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) 
discovered that one of its referees, Tim Donaghy, had been making bets 
for years on sporting events that he had officiated.36  Donaghy had also 
worked on behalf of a professional sports gambler to influence both the 
outcome of the event and the actual scores for each team, earning $2,000 
for each event he influenced.37  Eventually, the scheme fell apart, and 
Donaghy was arrested.38  These types of incidents that demonstrated how 
sports betting could potentially lead to rigged games created the negative 
perceptions that influenced public perception for many years.39  Scandals 
like the Black Sox and Tim Donaghy exemplify the harm to competitive 
integrity that Congress leveraged in banning sports betting following a 
1989 breach of integrity with Major League Baseball (“MLB”) star Pete 
Rose.40  In response to the Rose situation, and with broad support from 
the professional sports leagues,41 Congress decided to act and in 1992 
PASPA was signed into law.42 
 
it.  To this day this scandal remains one of the most publicized accounts of gambling can 
influence the outcome of a professional match. See Evan Andrews, The Black Sox Baseball 
Scandal, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news/the-black-sox-baseball-scandal-95-years-
ago [https://perma.cc/S9NF-8J9X] (last updated Oct. 22, 2018). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. See James C. W. Goodall, Bringing Down the House: An Examination of the Law and 
Policy Underpinning the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, 67 
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1097, 1103 n.25 (2015) (“Nevada created a state gaming board and 
authorized sports wagering in standalone locations.”). 





39. See id. (“[T]he more money there is inflowing to sport, the greater the sport 
corruption.”). 
40. See Goodall, supra note 35, at 1101–04 (previewing what came before PASPA as well 
as what was discussed during the formation of the legislation). 
41. S. REP. NO. 102–248 at 3 (1991). 
42. See Goodall, supra note 35, at 1103 (Reviewing the two precursor bills to PAPSA that 
took aim at state sports lotteries). 
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PASPA outlawed any state from authorizing sports gambling on 
both the professional and amateur level throughout the United States.43  
There were a few exceptions, including allowing existing sports betting 
systems in Nevada, Delaware, Montana, and Oregon to continue44 and 
providing safe harbors for two specific sports—horse racing and jai alai.45  
The most crucial exception allowed any state to authorize sports betting 
within one year of PASPA’s enactment.46  However, a state could only 
authorize sports betting within a municipality that had operated casino 
gaming for at least ten years prior to PASPA and was the only 
municipality allowed to operate casinos in the state’s constitution.47  This 
extremely narrow exception was crafted to only apply to Atlantic City, 
New Jersey.48  The state of New Jersey, however, was unable to pass 
sports betting legislation within one year and was unable to qualify for 
the carve out.49 
C.         Market and Public Response to PASPA 
While sports betting outside of these exempted states was illegal 
under PASPA, the market for sports wagering continued to evolve.50  
When PASPA was first enacted in 1992, public perception of sports 
betting was predominately negative, with 56% of Americans 
 
43. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 
3701–3704 (2018). 
44. The only states which this covered were Nevada, Oregon, Montana, and Delaware. See 
id. § 3704. (allowing for games to continue in places where there were already established 
regimes). 
45. Id. (allowing for betting on horse races and the little-known sport of jai-alai). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Ryan Rodenberg, Sports Betting Myth Busters: All of New Jersey Could Have Been 
Exempt From PASPA’S Ban, LEGAL SPORTS REP., (last updated Jan. 8, 2018) 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/17271/sports-betting-mythbusters-nj-and-paspa/ 
[https://perma.cc/6QKJ-3N7W]. 
49. See N.J. Gov. Chris Christie: "Let Them Try to Stop Us" from Sports Betting, CBS 
(May 25, 2012, 1:02 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nj-gov-chris-christie-let-them-
try-to-stop-us-from-sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/DYE6-JLZL] (exploring the challenges 
that New Jersey was bringing against PASPA, including why such challenges were necessary 
after getting a statutory carve out originally). 
50. Adam Silver, Opinion, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-
legalize-sports-betting.html [https://perma.cc/5HCF-96FK]; see also Bret McCormick, Rise 
of Fantasy Football Played a Big Part in League’s Growth, SPORTS BUS. J., (Sept. 2, 2019) 
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2019/09/02/Media/Fantasy.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/5SW5-2ZZC] (examining how perception shifted in the population and the 
growth of betting alternatives began); Maese, supra note 9. 
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disapproving of its legalization.51  By 2017, however, that perception had 
shifted to 55% of Americans now in favor of legalizing some form of 
sports betting.52  Furthermore, in stark contrast to prior testimony before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee when PASPA was being considered by 
Congress, the NBA reversed course and began to advocate for regulated 
sports betting.53  While other leagues were not willing to go as far as the 
NBA,  in 2015 MLB’s commissioner also began to publicly comment on 
reassessing the league’s existing position on sports betting.54 
In the absence of legal sports betting options, many consumers 
began to turn to fantasy sports.55  Fantasy sports involve participants 
putting in a few dollars to form a pot and then selecting professional 
athletes from real teams to create a fantasy team on paper.56  A fantasy 
team scores points based on how well the players that were “drafted” 
perform in any real games they play.57  The fantasy participants then track 
their players for an entire season and at the end distribute the pot 
depending on which fantasy team performed the best.58  The rise of 
fantasy sports was encouraged after a 2002 study found that fantasy 
sports participants watched more football than non-fantasy participants.59  
Indeed the National Football League (“NFL”) began to actively promote 
fantasy sports by creating their own licensed fantasy league.60  The 
primary growth in the fantasy sports market was driven by daily fantasy 
sports (“DFS”), which shortens the length from a season to a single 
weekend or day of games.61  DFS works the same as traditional fantasy 
 
51. Maese, supra note 9. 
52. Id. 
53. Compare Silver, supra note 50 (providing support for the legalization of sports betting 
from the perspective of the professional sports leagues) with S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3 
(testifying in support of the bill which would become PASPA). 
54. David Purdum, MLB to Talk Betting with Owners, ESPN (Feb. 5, 2015), 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/12286521/mlb-commissioner-rob-manfred-says-
legalized-sports-betting-needs-fresh-consideration [https://perma.cc/M8RP-HGBZ]. 
55. Fantasy sports consist of people drafting players to make up fantasy teams to compete 
against each other. The better that a player statistically does in an individual match, the more 
points the fantasy team owner will get for that week. Joseph Stromberg, Fantasy Football, 
Explained for Non-Football Fans, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2014/8/15/6003131/fantasy-
football-how-to-play-draft-rankings [https://perma.cc/L2H3-G8KW] (last updated Aug. 24, 
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sports but with teams drafted every day rather than every season.62  The 
two largest providers of DFS are DraftKings and FanDuel.63  The two 
companies have worked hard establishing themselves; at one point, 
between the two companies, they were airing a national advertisement 
every ninety seconds.64 
D.         Demise of PASPA and Proliferation of Sports Betting 
While the world changed rapidly around it, PASPA remained 
relatively unchallenged for many years,65 and sports betting was relegated 
to the sports halls of Nevada, while DFS grew as the favored sports-based 
gaming pastime.66  This changed in 2011 when New Jersey put sports 
betting on the ballot in a referendum to legalize sports betting in Atlantic 
City casinos.67  After the referendum was approved by 64% of its voters, 
New Jersey passed the New Jersey Sports Wagering Law.68  The 
professional sports leagues moved fast and sought an injunction in an 
effort to void the law, eventually leading to NCAA v. Christie.69  In this 
case, the federal district court held that PASPA did not violate the Tenth 
Amendment—which reserves all power not delegated to the federal 
government for the states—and that the New Jersey law was 





63. Legal US Online Sports Betting and Mobile Betting Apps, PLAYUSA, 
https://www.playusa.com/sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/TXK5-TAH4] (last visited Sept. 
19, 2020). 
64. See David Purdum, Public’s Biggest Issue with DFS Industry, ESPN (Feb. 17, 2016), 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/14791813/daily-fantasy-origin-hatred-daily-fantasy-
sports [https://perma.cc/3FBQ-6NZ9] (explaining how public perception has changed in 
regard to DFS and what they do that makes people dislike them). 
65. See OFC Comm Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 294 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing how 
Delaware tried to expand on their sports betting in 2009, but the 3rd circuit held that PASPA 
(1) barred parts of the proposed system and (2) preempted expansion of the legacy program 
of exclusive NFL parlays). 
66. See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 
3701–3704 (2018) (allowing sports betting in Nevada, as well as a few other states that 
previously hosted certain types of sports betting). 
67. N.J. Gov. Chris Christie: "Let Them Try to Stop Us" from Sports Betting, supra note 
49. 
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-1, et seq. (2012). 
69. NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 555 (D.N.J. 2013), aff'd sub nom. NCAA v. 
Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
70. Id. 
2021] ONLINE SPORTS BETTING 515 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.71  After Christie, New Jersey sought to 
allow sports betting by removing all restrictions on sports betting because 
PASPA’s language prevents authorization.72  However, this 
interpretation of the statute was again rejected by the Third Circuit73 
leading to the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy.74  The Court 
disagreed with the Third Circuit and found that PASPA violated the 
anticommandeering provision of the Tenth Amendment, which prohibits 
the federal government from compelling state actors to enforce federal 
law.75  While, traditionally, the anticommandeering provision was 
applied to issues where the federal government was requiring state action, 
the Court found that a prohibition on state action would fall within the 
purview just the same.76  Without the primary ban in place, the Court 
found that none of the provisions of PASPA were severable and rendered 
the entire law void.77  
Many states reacted swiftly following the 2018 decision in 
Murphy, with twenty-two states and D.C. legalizing sports betting by the 
end of 2020.78  Without a central model to follow, states adopted different 
approaches to regulating sports betting.79  One of the primary differences 
between these approaches is the decision of whether to allow online 
sports betting.80  Despite the fact that online sports betting could 
theoretically occur anywhere in the world, all states which currently have 
allowed for online sports betting have also limited it to their own 
borders.81  In total, ten states allow for some variation of mobile sports 
betting off the premises of a licensed casino.82  An eleventh state, 
 
71. NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 241 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated 
by Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
72. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct 1461, 1473 (2018) (explaining the history of the case 
up to the Supreme Court). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. See id. at 1478. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. (“[W]e hold that no provision of PASPA is severable from the provision directly at 
issue in these cases.”). 
78. These states are: Oregon, Nevada, Montana, Colorado, New Mexico, Iowa, Arkansas, 
Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Indiana, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, 
New Jersey, Delaware, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire. Legal US Online Sports Betting 
and Mobile Betting Apps, supra note 63. 
79. See id. (detailing which states allow betting and what type). 
80. Id. (listing which states mobile betting is allowed and how it may be performed). 
81. See, e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (requiring certain protections for online sports 
betting to ensure it occurs within the state). 
82. See Legal US Online Sports Betting and Mobile Betting Apps, supra note 63 (describing 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Rhode Island, Iowa, Oregon, Indiana, Illinois, 
Colorado, Nevada). 
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Mississippi, offers mobile betting but only on the premises of a physical 
casino.83 
Currently, all states that allow mobile betting still require that it 
be tied to a physical casino, meaning that all online sportsbooks must 
operate under the gaming license of a current physical location even if 
the sportsbook does not offer in person services.84  DraftKings and 
FanDuel are the biggest casino partners, with at least one of these two 
industry giants operating in every state with legalized mobile betting, 
aside from Oregon and Rhode Island.85  Their domination of the 
marketplace has provided the closest thing to uniform regularity in the 
industry, as these two giants provide most of the bookmakers in the 
United States.86 
Sports betting between states can look very different, particularly 
in regards to registering an account to access online betting, with some 
states requiring in-person activation before an account may be used.87  In 
states which restrict sports betting to physical casinos, DraftKings and 
FanDuel do not have the same type of presence, as they are only able to 
offer DFS.88  Banks that wish to work with sports betting operators need 
to be aware of the state regulatory framework applicable to their 
customers.89  
III.  FEDERAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAW 
With the end of PASPA, there is no longer any federal law that 
limits state-based sports betting, whether online or in-person.90  Yet 
despite this, many banks have decided to wait for federal action before 
engaging with the industry.91  The primary reason that banks have been 




85. Id. (explaining how Oregon offers their own mobile betting through the state lottery 
and Rhode Island offers their own sportsbook through the UK provider International Game 
Technology). 
86. See Andrew Bary, Online Gambling Booms in N.J., Lifting DraftKings’ Stock, 
BARRONS (June 15, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/online-gambling-booms-in-n-j-
lifting-draftkings-stock-51592236341 [https://perma.cc/36V4-SRJA] (holding market shares 
of 43% for Fanduel and 38% for DraftKings in NJ alone). 
87. Legal US Online Sports Betting and Mobile Betting Apps, supra note 63. 
88. Id. 
89. See Wack, supra note 12 (advising banks to start charting a course due to the amount 
of money that may be in play soon). 
90. See, e.g., Federal Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2018). 
91. Prior, supra note 11. 
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laundering scandal.92  At the federal level, there are still an array of anti-
money laundering laws that keep banks waiting on the sidelines.93  Some 
of these laws, such as the Wire Act94 and the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”),95 are avoided by the structuring of 
sportsbook operations in individual states.96  The Wire Act prohibits the 
use of wire communication97 for the interstate transmission of bets.98  The 
states have been able to do this by restricting all gambling, even online, 
to be permitted only within the borders of the state.99  The UIGEA 
prohibits any gambling entity from accepting payment that (1) came 
through the internet and (2) is in violation of any federal or state law.100  
Because sportsbooks begin operation in individual states in accordance 
with new local laws, no law is being broken and the UIGEA is avoided.101 
Unlike the Wire Act or UIGEA, the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”)102 
is an anti-money laundering statute that is not limited to interstate 
commerce or reliant on another law to trigger, meaning it is the only 
federal law that has not been completely bypassed by the states.103  The 
BSA requires financial institutions to report two different things: cash 
transactions over $10,000 in a single day and any suspicious activity.104  
Suspicious activity is a broad array of conduct but industry experts agree 
it can include things such as bulk transactions, transactions consistently 
below reporting thresholds, sudden bursts in low-activity accounts, or 
dealing between unconnected businesses just to name a few.105  Banks 
can be held liable for partner organizations’ money laundering activity, 
which has led to many banks acting as secondary enforcers of their casino 
 
92. Id. 
93. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1951–1959 (2018). 
94. Federal Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084. 
95. 31 U.S.C. § 5361 et seq (2018). 
96. See, e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/25-25 (requiring all gambling to take place within 
the state if it occurs online). 
97. A wire communication is any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use 
of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like 
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such 
connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing 
or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or 
communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C § 2510(1) (2018). 
98. Federal Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084. 
99. See e.g., § 45/25-25 (restricting all online gambling to within the state’s borders). 
100. 31 U.S.C § 5361 et seq. 
101. Id. 
102. 12 U.S.C. § 1951–1959 (2018). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Diana Byron, Suspicious Activity Reporting for Dummies 8 (Alison Maclean eds., 
2013). 
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partners’ anti-money laundering programs by reviewing their procedures 
and practices to make sure there are no vulnerabilities.106  Additionally, 
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has indicated its intent to 
police sports betting just as closely as normal casino functions.107  
However, many states and sports betting companies are taking steps to 
mitigate this risk in the hopes of assuaging bank’s fears.108 
Historical suggestions for alleviating the burden banks face 
included the possibility of adding a safe harbor for any bank that 
unknowingly helps perpetrate money laundering.109  In 2001 Senator 
John McCain from Arizona suggested protecting any financial institution 
that is unknowingly involved in internet gambling, which in this way 
would protect from any penalty under the Wire Act.110  However this 
suggestion, and others like it,111 never progressed,112 and there has been 
no ease in the diligence expected from banks in combating money 
laundering.113  This lack of federal action has left many banks waiting on 
the sidelines, despite the massive amount of growth in sports betting.114 
While the money laundering risk continues, sports betting is 
growing at an astounding rate.115  This has encouraged some banks to 
bide their time, but the pace of sports betting legalization at the state level 
is picking up steam quickly.116  In 2020, that number has risen by seven 
states to include a total of twenty-five states, including three due to ballot 
 
106. Peter Rudegeair & Brett Wolf, Regulators Pushing Banks to Rid Casinos of Money-
Laundering, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2014, 1:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-
casinos-analysis/regulators-pushing-banks-to-rid-casinos-of-money-laundering-
idUSKBN0GF0BV20140815 [https://perma.cc/WD9H-UJK2]. 
107. Kenneth Blanco, Prepared Remarks of FinCEN Director Kenneth A. Blanco, 
Delivered at the 12th Annual Las Vegas Anti-Money Laundering Conference, (Aug. 13, 2019) 
https://www.fincen.gov/news/speeches/prepared-remarks-fincen-director-kenneth-blanco-
delivered-12th-annual-las-vegas-anti [https://perma.cc/5DWB-62SU]. 
108. See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/25-25 (providing all the protections Illinois requires 
from sports betting), See also 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-61.2-16 (2020) (adding sports 
betting to the list of activities under the eye of the Rhode Island Lottery); See e.g., How 
DraftKings Keeps Onboarding Security Swift and Out of Sight, PYMNTS (Apr. 23, 2019), 
https://www.pymnts.com/digital-onboarding/2019/draftkings-sports-betting-identity-
verification-security/ [https://perma.cc/L2YW-9NSS] (exploring what companies are doing 
to mitigate money laundering). 
109. Amateur Sports Integrity Act, S. 718, 107th Cong. (2001). 
110. Id. 
111. Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act, H.R. 556 107th Cong. § 3(e) 
(2001). 
112. S. Rep. No. 107-16, at 12. 
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referendums.117  Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has seen an 
additional surge in online sports betting, providing states with more 
betting-related tax revenue than they expected118 at a time when tax 
receipts from other sources dropped significantly.119  
If banks seek to do business in the sports betting industry, the 
biggest change they must make will be to allow customers to transfer their 
funds from their bank accounts to betting accounts held by the 
sportsbook.120  Because banks have been wary of sports betting, they have 
not allowed credit card companies to offer their services in funding a 
bettor’s account.121  While some bank transfers occur,122 many of the 
biggest banks still prohibit their customers from making transfers to a 
sports betting account.123  As banks prevent their customers from making 
online transfers, banks force players to either not make bets or to switch 
to another provider who is willing to do business with bookmakers.124  
Additionally, banks should not just hope that customers will be satisfied 
with on-site betting only.125  Mobile betting, in particular, draws in 
significantly more players, with early reports suggesting that two-thirds 
of wagers were being made on a mobile application.126  As online sports 





119. Liz Farmer, Covid-19 Has Cost States $31 Billion In Tax Revenue—And That’s Just 
The Beginning, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2020, 8:30 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lizfarmer/2020/10/15/covid-19-has-cost-states-31-billion---
and-thats-just-the-beginning/?sh=474b612b2790 [https://perma.cc/N448-PQ5T]. 
120. See Wack, supra note 12 (explaining how banks are wary of involving themselves 
with sports betting). 
121. See Wack, supra note 12 (“If credit card companies dip their toes into these waters, 
they will need to monitor customer activity closely for signs of problem gambling.”). 
122. Prior, supra note 11 (“While banks are more open to clearing in-person betting 
transactions, the hope in the gaming industry is that as more states legalize sports gambling, 
more financial companies will begin to allow their cards to be used for online wagers.”). 
123. Id. 
124. See Wack, supra note 12 (“But if banks decide to ban sports gambling on their cards, 
they will risk alienating many good customers.”). 
125. See John T. Holden, Regulating Sports Wagering, 105 IOWA L. REV. 575, 612-13 
(2020) (explaining how online sports betting draws in far more players). 
126. Id. 
127. See Wack, supra note 12 (“But if banks decide to ban sports gambling on their cards, 
they will risk alienating many good customers.”). 
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IV.  SPORTS BETTING IS NOT RELIANT ON FEDERAL ACTION LIKE 
CANNABIS 
 While sports betting continues to be legalized at the state level, 
many banks have decided to not engage with the industry.128  Despite this 
patient approach, federal action, including a safe harbor, seems unlikely 
to occur any time soon.129  Even in the face of federal inaction, many 
banks still view the sports betting industry as too risky, often comparing 
it to the cannabis industry.130  Like sports betting, the cannabis industry 
has grown quickly in recent years in reaction to legislative and regulatory 
changes at the state level.131  Prior to these changes, both industries were 
illegal for a long time at the federal level,132 and indeed cannabis still is 
despite the state legalization.133  Additionally, both industries have been 
shunned by banks despite the recent proliferation of legalization at the 
state level.134  These similarities have resulted in many banks asking for 
a similar safe harbor to be created in both industries at the federal level 
before they will get involved in either.135  While the similarities between 
cannabis and sports betting make it appealing to treat them both the same 
way, the differences between the industries require a more nuanced 
approach.136  The key distinction between assessing bank activity in the 
cannabis industry versus bank activity in the sports betting industry is that 
cannabis remains illegal under federal law137 while sports betting is 
currently entirely left up to the states and no longer subject to any 
overriding federal prohibition.138 
 
128. Id. 
129. See Why We Won’t See A Federal Sports Betting Bill Soon, supra note 22 (exploring 
why any federal action would be unlikely). 
130. See Alix, supra note 10 (“Like legal pot, online gambling isn’t going away, and the 
money involved is expected to be phenomenal.”). 
131. Gabriel J. Greenbaum, What to Do with All This Green: Using Casino Regulations As 
A Model for Cannabis Industry Banking, 58 WASHBURN L.J. 217, 218–19 (2019). 
132. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2020) (making cannabis illegal); see also Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2018) (making 
sports betting illegal). 
133. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11. 
134. Greenbaum, supra note 130, at 219–20. 
135. See H.R. 1595, 116th Cong. (2019) (providing a safe harbor for any bank which 
unintentionally assists in money laundering). 
136. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (making cannabis illegal to own under federal law, which 
means the market could be shut down at any time). But see Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 
1461, 1484 (2018) (ending federal regulation of sports betting). 
137. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (making cannabis illegal to own under federal law, which means 
the market could be shut down at any time). 
138. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct 1461, 1484 (2018). 
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With cannabis still illegal at the federal level, there are numerous 
risks banks may face when seeking to do business with a cannabis 
dispensary even when that dispensary is operated according to state 
law.139  All proceeds associated with cannabis are illegal under anti-
money laundering statutes, regardless of whether the proceeds are 
generated in a legal manner.140  Additionally, cannabis-related assets may 
be seized under current federal forfeiture law, both in civil suits and 
criminal cases.141  Finally, banks face a “reputational risk” as a result of 
being subject to seizures and forfeitures.142  In spite of all of these risks, 
some banks have started to process state cannabis tax revenue.143  
However, banks have moved forward cautiously and analyzed each state 
independently, weighing the current risks against the long-term benefits 
of the cannabis industry.144 
Instead of sitting on the sidelines, banks should focus on 
evaluating the state-specific protections that make working with sports 
betting operators less risky.145  Due to the fact that sports betting has also 
unfolded in a similar state-by-state fashion, banks can examine each state 
individually.146  In fact, the state-by-state analysis will be more effective 
for sports betting, as there are no overarching federal regulations causing 
issues, as is the case regarding the cannabis industry.147  Because the 
pressure put on the cannabis industry was due to the active federal 
probation and uncertainty surrounding enforcement, states can do little to 
assuage banks.148  Banks’ biggest uncertainties in regards to sports betting 
stem from the BSA and the potential fines that may be levied if a bank is 
found to have violated the law.149  In spite of this uncertainty, it remains 
possible for sports betting to operate without breaking federal law, 
 
139. See Katherine P. Franck, Cannabis Reform: High on the Banking Agenda, 24 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 163, 167 (2020) (detailing the risks banks face such a money laundering suits 
and forfeiture). 
140. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2018). 
141. Franck, supra note 139. 
142. Id. 
143. Alix, supra note 10. 
144. See id. (explaining that only some states have been chosen to receive bank support as 
well as the fact that future benefits may be too much for banks to ignore). 
145. See id. (explaining how sports betting is growing and will likely continue to develop 
at the state level). 
146. See id. (explaining that banks will approach online gambling the same way they 
approached marijuana). 
147. See Franck, supra note 139 (exploring some of the risks the cannabis industry faces 
from broad federal laws concerning money laundering and forfeiture). 
148. See id. (suggesting federal actions so that banks may support the cannabis industry). 
149. Prior, supra note 11. 
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whereas the cannabis industry is unable to do that because of the federal 
ban on cannabis proceeds.150 
V.  BEST PRACTICES FROM COMPANIES AND STATES IN SPORTS BETTING 
Currently over half of the country has legalized sports betting, 
including three states in the November 2020 election.151  In spite of this, 
many banks are still waiting for federal guidance.152  Much of this 
hesitation stems from a fear of being targeted by federal authorities for 
unknowingly assisting in financial crimes, primarily money 
laundering.153  This fear is founded on recent history, as banks that did 
business with casinos were consistently targeted by federal law 
enforcement in the past.154  These risks should not stop banks from getting 
involved with online sports betting, as they have been mitigated by 
legislation155 and industry response.156 
A.          Money Laundering Risk Is Mitigated By State Legislation and 
Market Diligence  
Money laundering involves exchanging money, obtained through 
illicit means, such as drug trafficking,157 for something which can later 
be exchanged, or “laundered”, for “clean” money which is not 
attributable to the illicit activity.158  In the traditional casino context, 
illicitly obtained money is converted into is casino chips, which are then 
laundered into clean money when the chips are cashed out by the 
casino.159  While money laundering is difficult to identify, it is not 
 
150. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2020). 
151. Prior, supra note 11. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Rudegeair, supra note 105 (exploring how banks have begun to bear the brunt of 
regulation in typical casinos). 
155. See e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (explaining some of Illinois protections added 
to online sports betting). 
156. See How DraftKings Keeps Onboarding Security Swift and Out of Sight, supra note 
107 (explaining how DraftKings has sought to protect competitive integrity of sports betting). 
157. Dirty money is illegally gotten gains such as money from drug deals. See, Ethan 
Baker, How Money Laundering Works in Online Gambling, CASINO.ORG (July 7, 2019), 
https://www.casino.org/blog/money-laundering-in-online-casinos/ [https://perma.cc/B9X2-
HKDK] (“such as the cash proceeds of a drug deal.”). 
158. Id. 
159. Chips are the currency of casinos. See Rudegeair, supra note 105 (exploring how 
money laundering traditionally works). 
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impossible.160  The brightest warning signs include individuals using 
multiple bank accounts to fund betting, adding funds in multiple small 
amounts rather than large deposits, wiring money to international 
subsidiaries, and wiring funds from accounts not linked with the 
individual.161  In particular, wiring funds from many different accounts 
has been noted to be an effective tool for the patient money launderer.162  
The risk of being fined for unknowingly assisting in the process of money 
laundering remains the biggest motivator for banks to wait for federal law 
before engaging in sports betting.163 
The first line of defense against money laundering in sports 
betting is the sportsbooks themselves.164  Banks need partner sportsbooks 
to take precautions so that they do not have a situation where they need 
to act as secondary regulators as was the case with casinos historically.165  
Currently, many sportsbooks include protections in the process of setting 
up a betting account, such as identity verification so that the sportsbook 
has at least one person tied to the account.166  Additionally, some 
sportsbooks follow standard know your customer “guidelines.”167   
Recently, sportsbooks have also taken strides to ensure that these 
added protections do not cause any interruption on the customer’s 
behalf.168  DraftKings has begun using a “data-driven” approach to 
enrollment which has allowed it to streamline the process of registering 
new users.169  This approach entails verifying personal information the 
sportsbook has collected through outside firms before turning to the 
customer to seek any information they were unable to collect.170  This 
makes it easier for customers to join, as they only need to fill in any 
 
160. See Joseph Rillotta, Beyond the Sar-c: Best Practices for Gaming Companies to 
"Know Their Customer" and Avoid Organizational Money Laundering Liability in the Post-
Sands Climate, 5 UNLV GAMING L.J. 145, 147–49 (2014) (listing what federal prosecutors 
think are best ways to identify money laundering). 
161. See Id. (Reciting factors listed by federal prosecutors in the wake of the Las Vegas 
Sands scandal). 
162. Baker, supra note 156 (“[the] process is even harder to detect if the criminals are 
patient enough to break their loot down into small amounts.”). 
163. Prior, supra note 11. 
164. See How DraftKings Keeps Onboarding Security Swift and Out of Sight, supra note 
107 (exploring a few of the ways DraftKings tries to minimize illegal activity). 
165. See Rudegeair, supra note 105 (exploring how banks have begun to bear the brunt of 
the regulation when working with typical casinos). 
166. How DraftKings Keeps Onboarding Security Swift and Out of Sight, supra note 107. 
167. Ian McKendry, Are Fantasy Sports Sites a Money Laundering Haven, AM. BANKER, 
(Oct. 09, 2015, 3:00 PM) http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/are-fantasy-
sports-sites-a-money-laundering-haven-1077178-1.html [https://perma.cc/C2HK-VHAR]. 
168. How DraftKings Keeps Onboarding Security Swift and Out of Sight, supra note 107. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
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missing information at the end.171  Changes such as this enable more 
customers to join than would otherwise be the case, due to the fact the 
registration process is able to continue moving quickly.172  
Beyond just the industry itself, individual states have also begun 
to create systems to combat money laundering.173  Some of these 
practices, such as limiting online sports betting to only occurring within 
the boundaries of the specific state, have already become the standard.174  
For the most part, however, states have gone their own way in deciding 
what they think would best suit the needs of their citizens.175  Although 
the regulatory structure differs between states, Illinois and Rhode Island 
have adopted several effective measures to combat money laundering 
which can serve as a template for banks to consider best practices for state 
action in combatting money laundering.176 
Illinois requires that all mobile sports bettors first register their 
accounts in-person at an authorized sports betting parlor.177  This ensures 
that a single person cannot create multiple accounts with a single 
sportsbook and helps to link the flow of money to the required person.178  
Indeed, in the past when casinos have been targeted by money launderers 
the have often used multiple accounts to fund the gambling.179  This is 
done so that it is more difficult to track whether or not the money was 
ever the proceeds of illicit activity.180  By linking accounts to a single 
person, a sportsbook ensures that whenever a bet is placed, there should 




173. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484 (2018) (striking down the federal law 
and leaving the issue up to the states). 
174. See e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/25-25 (2019) (requiring certain protections for 
online sports betting to ensure it occurs within the state). 
175. Compare 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (putting sports betting under the Illinois 
gaming board) with 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.2-16 (2020) (adding sports betting to the 
domain of the Rhode Island Lottery). 
176. See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (providing all the protections Illinois requires from 
sports betting); see also 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.2-16 (adding sports betting to the 
list of activities under the eye of the Rhode Island Lottery). 
177. 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25. 
178. See Chris Grove, In-Person Registration For Online Sports Betting, IDEVELOPMENT 
& ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, https://ideagrowth.org/impact-of-in-person-registration/ 
[https://perma.cc/D9WR-BC5E] (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) (finding that is in-person 
registration was not used, over half of respondents would create multiple accounts).   
179. Rillotta, supra note 159, at 148. 
180. Id. 
181. See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (placing restrictions on sports betting accounts to 
promote public safety). 
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Rhode Island also requires in-person registration,182 but sets itself 
apart by giving oversight powers to its regulatory body that are much 
broader than other states’ centralized regulatory authorities.183  The 
Rhode Island Lottery (“Lottery”) is the state’s central gaming authority, 
with powers over the state operated lottery as well as all sports betting.184  
The Lottery may suspend online accounts, suspend account withdrawals, 
and require the production of statements of account activity.185  These 
provisions give the Lottery unparalleled access to accounts, which helps 
to enforce and maintain compliance.186  Structures like the one in Rhode 
Island should be appealing to banks, as it gives the state greater authority 
to investigate the betting companies which in turn mitigates the risk of 
money laundering occurring.187  
B.          States Are Imposing Sweeping Oversight Laws on Sports Betting 
Operators 
In 2014, when PASPA confined legal gambling to only a few 
states, federal regulators began to push banks to be more preemptive in 
investigating their casino partners.188  Unsurprisingly, banks have 
opposed this push to take a more active role in monitoring their business 
partners, as there is no benefit to the banks and they are still punished 
even if they do everything correctly.189  Additionally, acting as the 
enforcers of other businesses took up banks’ resources.190  However, at 
the state level, regulations on sports betting often put pressure on the 
sportsbook itself rather than any bank they might be doing business 
with.191 
States, such as Nevada, placed the burden of regulation and 
stamping out match fixing on the bookmakers, rather than the banks.192  
 
182. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.2-16. 
183. See id. (allowing for the lottery to mandate an audit of any account); see also, 230 ILL. 
COMP. STAT 45/25-25 (providing grants of authority to regulatory institutions created by the 
state). 
184. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN § 42-61.2-2.4. 
185. Id. § 42-61.2-16. 
186. See id. (providing access to the private accounts in order to ensure compliance). 
187. See id. (providing access to the private accounts in order to ensure compliance). 
188. Rudegeair, supra note 105. 
189. Id. 
190. See id. (“bank executives grumble about the extent of the work they have to do for 
government enforcement agencies now, and the penalty for failure.”). 
191. See Legal US Online Sports Betting and Mobile Betting Apps, supra note 63 (listing 
all the different ways in which sports betting is regulated). 
192. Andrew Smith, Why Georgia Should Get Off the Bench and Profit from the 
Inevitability of Sports Betting, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845, 856 (2020). 
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In particular, the state mandates submissions to the central gaming 
authority of suspicious activity that is observed by any employees.193  
While there could be problems with such a practice in online betting—
namely the fact that employees will not be able to see the players, Nevada 
has gone one step further and implemented the regulation against all 
sportsbooks, no matter if they are online or in person.194  This means that 
online sportsbooks will still be required to track the amounts being added 
to accounts and from which sources, even if they are not physically 
present when such activity takes place.195  Finally, Nevada has added 
some actions that are defined as suspicious, such as betting over $5000 
in the aggregate.196  Protections such as this should not impose additional 
work on the banks for the sportsbooks, as the onus is on the sportsbooks 
to make all mandatory reporting.197  Because of the BSA requirements, 
banks will still be at risk of penalty if they do not conduct their own due 
diligence.198  These requirements will reduce the risk of money 
laundering occurring in sports betting, the primary motivator for banks 
seeking to keep out of the industry.199  
C.         Potential for a Safe Harbor 
Despite everything states are doing to mitigate the risk of money 
laundering they will never be able to fully eliminate the risk, as federal 
law will still punish any bank which facilitates money laundering.200  
Because of this, many banks have decided that sports betting is too risky 
due to the federal fines associated with money laundering.201  This “de-
risking” is an issue that has stemmed from the lack of a safe harbor for 
banks that unknowingly assist in money laundering, which in turn 
prevents growing industries from accessing much needed funds.202  There 
have already been several proposals that would give banks such a safe 
 
193. NEVADA ADMIN. CODE 22.121 (2020). 
194. Id. 
195. Byron, supra note 104. 
196. NEV. ADMIN. CODE 22.121. 
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198. See 12 U.S.C. § 1951–1959 (2018) (requiring penalties for all violations regardless of 
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199. Prior, supra note 11. 
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2020, at 3:37 PM). 
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harbor which could provide the basis for any future legislation.203  
However, while a safe harbor would be the best case scenario for banks, 
federal action seems unlikely in the foreseeable future.204  Because of this 
banks should focus on the protections that are available, rather than 
waiting on protections that may not come for many years.205 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Sports betting is a large and growing industry,206 and banks will 
need to address not only whether to accept sportsbooks as customers but 
also in what capacity.207  Online sports betting presents a great 
opportunity for banks to make money in a rapidly expanding market, that 
has tailored itself to avoid money laundering.208  Currently, many banks 
have taken the same approach they had with the cannabis industry 
towards the sports betting industry and adopted a wait and see 
mentality.209  However, there are key differences between the two 
industries, and treating them the same could cost banks a valuable 
opportunity.210  At the same time, the states have taken it upon themselves 
to do their best at enticing banks by limiting the money-laundering risk.211  
There is no one state which has created a perfect sports betting 
system, but many states have begun to implement smart and prudential 
regulations.212  Banks should work with casinos in states that provide 
strong centralized gaming boards that have broad mandates to police for 
illegal activity.213 Additionally, banks should look to partner with sports 
 
203. See e.g., Amateur Sports Integrity Act, S. 718, 107th Cong. (2001). 
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and freeze any transactions). 
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betting operators in states where the onus is not on the bank but on the 
betting operator to police the transactions, as this should avoid a situation 
where the banks are being pushed to regulate the sports betting 
operators.214  The Murphy decision created a wild west of sorts in sports 
betting, and banks should begin a state-by-state analysis to find those 
which provide the best protection against money laundering rather than 
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